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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Gina Standley appeals from the district court's Judgment of Conviction in which
the court sentenced her to a unified term of ten years, with two years fixed, upon her
guilty plea to delivery of a controlled substance. Prior to sentencing, the district court
was provided information that Ms. Standley suffered mental health problems and had
reason to believe that these conditions would be a significant factor at sentencing;
however, no mental health evaluation was ordered.

Ms. Standley asserts that the

district court erred in failing to abide by the mandatory requirement of ordering a mental
health evaluation pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-2522.

Furthermore, Ms. Standley

asserts that the district court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
In September of 2010, 51 year-old Gina Standley agreed to act as an
intermediary between a methamphetamine dealer and a person who turned out to be a
confidential informant, facilitating the purchase of 1. 7 grams of methamphetamine,
paying for and taking a small amount of the drug for herself. (Presentence Investigation
Report (hereinafter, PSI), pp.2, 3.) The State filed a Criminal Complaint alleging that
Ms. Standley had committed the crime of delivery of methamphetamine. (R., pp.7-8.)
Ms. Standley waived her right to a preliminary hearing, was bound over into the district
court, and a Prosecuting Attorney's Information was filed charging her with the above
crime. (R., pp.12-15.) Pursuant to an agreement with the State, Ms. Standley pied
guilty as charged during her arraignment, and agreed to pay restitution; in exchange,
the State agreed not to file a second offense enhancement and to not exceed the
1

recommendation of the PSI writer. (R., pp.22-26; Tr. 12/22/10, p.5, L.3 - p.10, L.23.)
During the plea colloquy, Ms. Standley informed the district court that she receives
disability insurance, "because I had a brain aneurysm, 1 and I still have two more" and
that she takes "lots of medications ... one for nightmares and diabetes"; however,
Ms. Standley stated that she was able to understand her rights and the consequences
of her guilty plea, and the court accepted her plea. (Tr. 12/22/10, p.12, L.1 - p.19, L.7.)
In her PSI, Ms. Standley revealed that her son, James, died in a car accident in
1998 and "'a part of [her] died that night."' (PSI, p.6.) Two years later, she suffered a
brain aneurysm that '"broke in the frontal lobe'" and she has two more on the left side of
her brain.

(PSI, p.6.)

She stated that she "needs a mental health evaluation and

counseling now to help her deal with her son's death and for her anxiety and poor
judgment." (PSI, p.10.) Among the medications she was taking was Seroquel 2 to help
treat her "Brain Injury - Nightmares." (PSI, p.10.) An alcohol and drug evaluation was
conducted and the evaluator concluded that Ms. Standley's mental health symptoms
may interfere with alcohol and drug treatment and that she "would benefit from Dual
Diagnosis treatment." (Substance Abuse Eval, p.2.)
Ms. Standley's sentencing hearing was set-over in order for her to apply for a
problem solving court that would potentially help her deal with her mental health issues;
however, for reasons not clear on the record, she was denied access to the program.

1

A brain aneurysm "is a bulge or ballooning in a blood vessel in the brain" and can be
life-threatening if it ruptures; however, most aneurysms do not rupture and cause no
health problems, and treatment is available in some cases to lower the risk of rupture.
See
http://www.mayoclinic.com/health/brain-aneurysm/DS00582
(last
visited
February 24, 2012).
2
Serequel, a brand name for Quetiapine, is a medication used to treat the symptoms of
schizophrenia, and to treat or prevent episodes of mania or depression associated with
bi-polar disorder. See http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmedhealth/PMH0001030/ (last
visited February 23, 2012).
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(R., pp.34-38; Tr. 2/3/11, p.7, L.19 - p.9, L.23; Tr. 5/4/11, p.27, Ls.7-11.) During the
first sentencing hearing, the district court noted,
One thing that does concern me, and I don't know how much this is
still in play, but there was some reference that she couldn't complete the
Therapeutic Community while in prison the last time she was there
because of cognitive difficulties as a result from a brain aneurysm. It
that's still at play, if we have some sort of an organic brain dysfunction,
she's probably not going to do very well anywhere.
(Tr. 2/3/11, p.9, L.24 - p.10, L.7.) During the final sentencing hearing, Ms. Standley told
the court that she became a drug addict after the death of her son, that she is not a drug
dealer, and that she needs treatment and counseling.

(Tr. 5/4/11, p.30, L.5 - p.31,

L.10.) Counsel for Ms. Standley requested that the district court retain jurisdiction and
allow Ms. Standley to participate in the CAPP Rider program. (Tr. 5/4/11, p.27, Ls.1222.) The district court, however, imposed a unified sentence of ten years, with two years
fixed. (R., pp.48-51; Tr. 5/4/11, p.34, Ls.17-21.) Ms. Standley filed a timely Notice of
Appeal. 3 (R., p.57-60.)

3

Ms. Standley also filed a timely Rule 35 motion seeking leniency but failed to provide
new information, and her motion was denied by the district court. (R., pp.52-56, 61-62.)
Ms. Standley does not raise as an issue in this appeal, the district court's denial of her
Rule 35 motion. See State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201 (2007).
3
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ISSUES

1.

Did the district court err in failing to order a mental health evaluation pursuant to
I.C. § 19-2522, as the court had reason to believe that Ms. Standley's mental
health condition would be a significant factor at sentencing, and was the error not
harmless?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion by failing to retain jurisdiction?

4

ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Erred By Failing To Order A Mental Health Evaluation Pursuant To
I.C. § 19-2522, As The Court Had Reason To Believe That Ms. Standley's Mental
Health Condition Would Be A Significant Factor At Sentencing, And The Error Was Not
Harmless
A.

Introduction
The district court had information that Ms. Standley suffered mental health

issues, both physical and psychological in origin, and the court recognized that her
condition would be a significant factor at sentencing.

The court failed, however, to

abide by the plain language of Idaho Code § 19-2522 by failing to appoint a licensed
psychologist or psychiatrist to exam Ms. Standley and provide a report meeting the
requirements of I.C. § 19-2522(3). Because the information provided to the district court
did not otherwise meet the requirements of 19-2522(3), this Court should vacate
Ms. Standley's sentence and remand her case for further proceedings.

B.

The District Court Erred By Failing To Order A Mental Health Evaluation
Pursuant To l.C. § 19-2522 As The Court Had Reason To Believe That
Ms. Standley's Mental Condition Would Be A Significant Factor At Sentencing
Idaho Code § 19-2522(1) reads, in relevant part, as follows:
If there is reason to believe the mental condition of the defendant will be a
significant factor at sentencing and for good cause shown, the court shall
appoint at least one (1) psychiatrist or licensed psychologist to examine
and report upon the mental condition of the defendant.

I.C. § 19-2522(1) (emphasis added). The Idaho Supreme Court has recognized that the
decision to order an evaluation pursuant to I.C. § 19-2522 may be discretionary in some
circumstances; however, where the defendant's mental health condition will be a
significant sentencing factor, the statute mandates that the district court order a 19-2522
evaluation.

State v. Hanson,_ Idaho_, 2012 Opinion No. 10, pp.4-5 (January 6,
5
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2012) (citations omitted).

By the plain language of the statute itself, the obligation to

order an evaluation is upon the sentencing court and is not dependent upon a request
"from either the State or the defendant.

I.C. § 19-2522(1 ). 4 The governing criteria or

objectives of criminal punishment are: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the
defendant and others; (3) the possibility of the defendant's rehabilitation; and (4)

State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460-61

punishment or retribution for wrongdoing.

(2002) (citing State v. Howard, 135 Idaho 727 (2001 ).)
Ms. Standley asserts that the district court had reason to believe that her mental
health issues would be a significant factor at sentencing; specifically, there was reason
to believe that her mental condition would have a direct impact on her rehabilitative
potential. Ms. Standley bears a surgical scar from ear to ear across the top of her head.
(PSI, p.2.) She suffered a ruptured brain aneurysm that "'broke in the frontal lobe,"' and
she has two more on the left side of her brain. (PSI, p.6.) As a result, she is unable to
work as she has a difficult time focusing on the tasks at hand. (PSI, pp.6, 10.)
Ms. Standley also suffers psychological scars stemming from the death of her
son.

(PSI, pp.10-11.)

She informed the PSI writerthat"she needs a mental health

evaluation and counseling now to help her deal with her son's death and for her anxiety
and poor judgment." (PSI, p.10.) She also revealed that she suffers from emotional

4

In contrast to the plain language of I.C. § 19-2522 placing the burden of the court, the
plain language Idaho Code § 19-2523 requires the district court to receive evidence of
the defendant's mental condition only "if offered," indicating that the duty in the first
instance belongs to defense counsel to offer such evidence under that statute.
I.C. § 19-2523. Despite the plain language of I.C. § 19-2522, the Idaho Court of
Appeals has developed a jurisprudence requiring a defendant to demonstrate that the
district court showed "manifest disregard" for Idaho Criminal Rule 32 in failing to sua
sponte order a 19-2522 evaluation. See generally State v. Rollins, 152 Idaho 106
(Ct. App. 2011 ). Because this appeal is filed in the Idaho Supreme Court and because
the Idaho Supreme Court has never adopted the "manifest disregard" of I.C.R. 32
jurisprudence, Ms. Standley will make no further reference to that standard in this brief.

6

distress and she denies ever receiving grief counseling, but desires to participate in
some. (PSI, pp.10-11; Tr. 2/3/11, p.6, L.20 - p.7, L.2.)
Ms. Standley participated in a substance abuse evaluation pursuant to I.C. § 192524 and, although a mental health evaluation pursuant to that statute was not
conducted in full, the evaluator opined that Ms. Standley's
mental health symptoms may interfere with treatment unless her
symptoms and medications are closely monitored, thus it is recommended
that treatment coordinate with her current mental health provider. Client
would also likely benefit from individual mental health counseling to
specifically address her residual grief issues regarding the death of her
son. She would benefit from Dual Diagnosis treatment.
(Substance Abuse Eval, p.2.) Ms. Standley self-diagnosed an inability to complete the
therapeutic community program due to her inability to concentrate stemming from her
brain aneurysm. (PSI, p.11.) The PSI writer recommended that regardless of whether
or not the district court ordered a period of incarceration, Ms. Standley should be
required to obtain a mental health evaluation and to comply with any recommendations.
(PSI, p.14.)
Furthermore, "[a] district court's decisions or comments at sentencing may also
demonstrate that the defendant's mental condition was a significant factor in
determining the sentence." Hanson, _Idaho at_, 2012 Opinion No. 10 at 6. The
district court itself expressed a concern with Ms. Standley's mental health and how it
would affect her ability to participate in programming, stating:
One thing that does concern me, and I don't know how much this is still in
play, but there was some reference that she couldn't complete the
Therapeutic Community while in prison the last time she was there
because of cognitive difficulties as a result from a brain aneurysm. It
that's still at play, if we have some sort of an organic brain dysfunction,
she's probably not going to do very well anywhere.

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I~

7

(Tr. 2/3/11, p.9, L.24 - p.10, L. 7.) With all of the above information available to the
district court, and despite the court's own expressed concern about Ms. Standley's selfdiagnosed inability to participate in the therapeutic community program, the court failed
in its duty to order a 19-2522 evaluation.

C.

The Information Supplied To The District Court Did Not Adequately Substitute
For The Information Required By LC. § 19-2522
Idaho Code§ 19-2522(3) reads as follows:
The report of the examination shall include the following:
(a) A description of the nature of the examination;
(b) A diagnosis, evaluation or prognosis of the mental condition of the
defendant;
(c) An analysis of the degree of the defendant's illness or defect and level
of functional impairment;
(d) A consideration of whether treatment is avallable for the defendant's
mental condition;
(e) An analysis of the relative risks and benefits of treatment or
nontreatment;
(f) A consideration of the risk of danger which the defendant may create
for the public if at large.

I.C. § 19-2522(3). If the information provided to the district court through other means
satisfies the requirements of I.C. § 19-2522(3), the failure of the district court to order a
new mental health evaluation, where the defendant's mental condition will be a
significant factor at sentencing, will be considered harmless error. Hanson, _Idaho at
2012 Opinion No. 10 at 12-13 (citing State v. Harper, 129 Idaho 86, 91 (1996));

see also State v. Durham, 146 Idaho 364 (Ct. App. 2008).

8

The information provided to the district court in Ms. Standley's case did not
satisfy the requirements of LC. § 19-2522(3).

First and foremost, the sentencing

materials did not contain a record of any mental health evaluations; therefore, there was
no description of the nature of the examination as required by I.C. § 19-2522(3)(a).
(See generally, PSI.)

evaluation.

In fact, Ms. Standley denied ever having a mental health

(PSI, p.10.)

The PSI writer claims that previous PS ls indicate that

Ms. Standley had participated in grief counseling and had been treated for depression;
however, those prior PSls were not submitted to the district court.

(PSI, p.11.)

Furthrmore, none of the other requirements of I.C. § 19-2522(3) were met as there was
no diagnosis of Ms. Standley's condition, no analysis of her functional impairment, no
consideration of whether or not treatment is available for her, no analysis of the risks
and benefits of her participation in treatment, and no consideration of whether or not
she poses a risk to the public at large. (See generally, PSI.) The only analysis that was
provided to the district court came from the substance abuse evaluator who simply
opined that Ms. Standley's mental health may interfere with her ability to successfully
complete substance abuse treatment, and that any treatment she engage in should be
coordinated with treatment for her mental condition. (Substance Abuse Eval, p.2.)
In short, the materials provided to the district court do not meet the requirements
of I.C. § 19-2522(3), and the district court's failure to order an evaluation was not
harmless. Therefore, this Court should vacate Ms. Standley's sentence and remand her
case to the district court with instructions that the court order a 19-2522 evaluation.

9
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11.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Failing To Retain Jurisdiction

A.

Introduction
Assuming arguendo that the district court did not err in failing to order a mental

health evaluation, Ms. Standley asserts that the court nevertheless abused its discretion
by imposing an excessive sentence. In light of the mitigating evidence that exists in this
case, Ms. Standley asserts that the district court should have retained jursidction as
requested by her trial counsel.

B.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Failing To Retain Jurisdiction In Light
Of The Mitigating Factors That Exist In This Case
Ms. Standley asserts that, given any view of the facts, the district court abused its

discretion by failing to retain jurisdiction.

Where a defendant contends that the

sentencing court imposed an excessively harsh sentence, the appellate court will
conduct an independent review of the record giving consideration to the nature of the
offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the public interest.

See

State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982). The decision whether or not to retain
jurisdiction is a question left to the court's discretion.

I.C. § 19-2601 (4); State v.

Hernandez, 122 Idaho 227, 230 (Ct. App. 1992). The governing criteria or objectives of
criminal punishment are: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the defendant and
others; (3) the possibility of the defendant's rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or
retribution for wrongdoing.

State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460-61 (2002) (citing

State v. Howard, 135 Idaho 727 (2001 ).)
In addition to the evidence demonstrating that Ms. Standley suffers from mental
health problems articulated in section I of this brief above, which is not repeated but

10

which is incorporated herein by reference, and which should be considered as a
mitigating factor (see Hollon v. State, 132 Idaho 573, 581 (1999)), Ms. Standley asserts
that the other mitigating factors counsel towards a finding that the district court should
have retained jurisdiction.

First, although Ms. Standley pied guilty to delivery of a

controlled substance, she could hardly be considered a "drug dealer" as that term is
used in common parlance. Ms. Standley, a drl..lg user herself, essentially acted as an
intermediary between a drug-dealer and a person who turned out to be a confidential
informant. (PSI, pp.2-3.) The district court recognized that Ms. Standley was a drug
addict who was just trying to get by, and not what the court would consider to be a drug
dealer. (Tr. 5/4/11, p.32, Ls.5-15.)
Ms. Standley has a long history of using substances but she did not become an
addict until she started using methamphetamine to help her dull the pain caused by the
loss of her son. (PSI, pp.6, 11-12; Tr. 5/4/11, p.30, L.5 - p.31, L.9.) As noted above,
the substance abuse evaluator recommended that Ms. Standley receive dual-diagnosis
mental health and substance abuse treatment. (See generally Substance Abuse Eva I.)

Ms. Standley apologized to the court for her behavior and expressed that she was just
"sick" about what she had done. (PSI, p.13; Tr. 5/4/11, p.31, Ls.8-9.)
Idaho Courts recognize that in determining an appropriate sentence, the district
court should consider the nature of the crime and the character of the offender. In light
of Ms. Standley's mental health and substance abuse issues, coupled with her remorse
and the relatively benign nature of her crime, she asserts that the district court abused
its discretion by failing to retain jurisdiction.

See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771

(Ct. App. 1982); State v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 204 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Nice, 103
Idaho 89 (1982).
11

CONCLUSION
Ms. Standley respectfully requests that this Court vacate her sentence and
remand her case to the district court with instructions that the court order a mental
health evaluation pursuant to I.C. § 19-2522. Alternatively, Ms. Standley requests that
this Court remand her case to the district court with instructions that the district court
retain jurisdiction or to reduce her sentence as this Court deems appropriate.
DA TED this 28th day of February, 2012.
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